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Germany and Israel have not succeeded in turning their
historical connection into a shared project around which a
true friendship can form.
by Blog Admin
Felix Berenskoetter argues that a shared commitment to the memory of the Holocaust and
to Israel’s right to exist has not formed a true friendship between Germany and Israel.
Disagreements about how Israel should handle its security in the face of potential threats from
Iran show that a new debate about the nature of the relationship between the two countries
and the shared project of Israel’s security is now needed.
When there is a meeting between German and Israeli government of f icials, it has become a
ritual to hail relations between the countries as a f riendship. In 2008, even the Economist
suggested that ‘Germany is Israel’s second best f riend’ (the f irst one being the US). Is this just nice talk?
Few would dispute that the relationship is ‘special’ in some way. To evaluate whether it can be called a
f riendship in a meaningf ul way, we need some basic markers of  ‘f riendship’ in international relations.
Scholars have long claimed that
f riendship is possible not only on the
personal level but also between
states/nations. Yet only recently literature
is emerging which looks more closely at
what this involves. In my reading,
f riendship, and with it trust, honesty and
solidarity, revolves around a shared
project that both sides are committed to
invest in and that provides them with a
sense of  ontological security. The project
is based on overlapping biographical
narratives, that is, a sense of  a shared
past and a shared f uture. Especially, it
requires a common vision of  building a
better world that binds f riends in creative
interaction and manif ests a productive
relationship that benef its both. In this
relationship f riends regard each other as
equals and practice a unique logic of
reciprocity in which there is no debt but
mutual trust that each side contributes as much as it can to keep the project on track. On this basis, let me
of f er a f ew thoughts on whether German-Israeli relations can be considered a f riendship.
A potential shared project lies in (dealing with) the memory of  the Holocaust, or Shoa. As Chancellor Merkel
stated in her speech to the Knesset in 2008 “Germany and Israel are and will always remain linked in a
special way by the memory of  the Shoah.” Indeed, the memory is a core element of  respective national
identit ies, that is, a central component of  the self - image each country holds and that allows f or a sense of
stability in space and time, thus providing ontological security. For Israel’s identity as a Jewish state, the
Shoa is the most powerf ul example of  a history of  persecution and suf f ering and has become a def ining
element of  Jewish identity as a community of  f ate, as a vulnerable people, as victims. Correspondingly, it
f uels the commitment to create an environment that protects Jewish people f rom f urther aggression.
Intrinsic to the memory of  the Shoa is the perpetrator, Germany, and this memory is also a core ref erence
f or the identity of  post-1945 Germany. It marks ‘Germany’ as a nation guilty of  having committed (one of )
the biggest crimes against humanity and sets out the task to both accept this responsibility and build a
‘new’ Germany that bears no resemblance, and won’t allow a return, to the Nazi past.
So f or both Israel and Germany the Shoa serves as a negative ref erence point. It is a memory they vow to
keep alive as a warning and as a commitment to explore its causes and ensure something like it will never
happen again. It is a shared history neither side wants f orgotten, yet also an experience each tries to
escape f rom. And here the two need each other. Israel’s recognition of  post-1945 Germany as distinct f rom
Nazi Germany has been vital f or lending credibility to this new status. And Germany turned into a steadf ast
supporter of  Israel’s attempt to create a secure home f or the Jewish people. This appears to be a
productive reciprocal dynamic.
And yet, even in the attempt to move on, the memory of  the Shoa continues to t ie the two nations to a
past that issues a clear role distribution of  victim and perpetrator. Every of f icial visit and interaction takes
place in the shadow of  this memory and, unwillingly perhaps, revives this role distribution. It puts Germany
in the bind to make good f or past actions that can never be f orgiven and, hence, to pay of f  a debt that can
never be paid of f . This inevitably reserves the moral high ground in the relationship f or Israel, which can
af f ord to take advantage of , even actively invest in, the German guilt-complex. At the same time, as Grass
points out, it inhibits German polit ical and intellectual elites to take a crit ical stance vis-à-vis Israel out of
f ear that this will be perceived as anti-semitism, which would damage Germany’s (still f ragile) status as a
pro-Jewish/Israeli state. Thus, f or better or worse, making the Shoa the primary place of  connection
sustains a f undamental inequality in the relationship.
This carries over in the f orward- looking element, namely the ‘never again’ commitment manif ested in Israel’s
right to exist, its security. At f irst glance there appears to be a shared project here. An obvious core
concern f or Israel, it is also an intrinsic part of  Germany’s project of  Wiedergutmachung. As Merkel put it in
her 2008 speech, Israel’s security is “Germany’s historical responsibility [and] part of  my country’s raison
d’etre“ that would never be negotiable. While this commitment appears to be a powerf ul indicator of  a
f riendship, at closer look it is primarily a source of  tension and reveals another f acet of  the inequality in the
relationship. Perhaps most obviously, the solidarity commitment is one-sided; at least I am not aware of  an
Israeli polit ical leader ever making a similar pledge of  support f or Germany’s security. Most importantly,
Israel’s security is not really a truly shared project.
Take the current debate over how to deal with Iran. Israel’s government under Netanyahu considers military
strikes necessary to prevent the possibility of  an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel. The German government
lead by Merkel opposes this option, not least because it might trigger a dynamic of  counterattacks bringing
death and destruction to the region, including Israel. Beneath the debate over the right approach (military
power versus diplomacy/sanctions) is the deeper question, rarely voiced, whether Israel f aces an existential
threat in the f irst place. Even if  Iran acquires nuclear weapon capability, would it use such a weapon against
Israel? There is no way of  telling, but despite the long-standing anti-Z ionist rhetoric of  Iranian leaders, it is
dif f icult to see why deterrence would f ail. That the Netanyahu government thinks otherwise is not because
it has superior knowledge of  Iran’s intentions, but because it views Iran’s rhetoric and actions through the
prism of  the memory of  the Shoa. Or, one could say, it mobilizes this memory to lead the debate about
Israel’s security in a particular direction.
Either way, the Iran issue highlights the scope f or disagreement over the conception of  Israel’s security and
how to invest in it. Whereas both Iranian intentions and the consequences of  an Israeli attack are unknown,
the Israeli government claims to be in a better posit ion to know, that is, it claims analytical
Deutungshoheit and declares alternative views ignorant, indeed dangerous. Of  course, identif ying threats to
Israel and putting in place protective measures is the sovereign right, indeed duty, of  every Israeli
government. Yet f or Israel’s security to be truly a shared project, the German government would need the
trust of  the Israeli people to (help) decide how to best secure their existence, de facto giving Germany a
share of  Israel’s sovereignty. This is dif f icult to even imagine. And so, we have a situation in which Israel
def ines the situation and the support required, and Germany, in a sort of  moral entrapment, is obliged to
deliver.
Disagreement over how to secure Israel also plays out in dif f erences regarding the desirability of  a ‘two
state solution’. Like many others, the German government sees peacef ul co-existence with a Palestinian
state as the best path towards sustainable security f or Israel and peace in the region. And so, when Berlin
shows solidarity with Israel on controversial issues and quietly f inances Israel’s military build-up, it expects
reciprocity through credible moves towards solving the conf lict with the Palestinians, f irst and f oremost by
putting on hold its policy of  territorial expansion through Jewish settlements. Yet this has not happened. It
is an open secret that the Netanyahu government does not care much about the vision of  a two-state
solution and, hence, invests as litt le as possible in it, causing disappointment and f rustration in Berlin.
In short, it appears that Germany and Israel have not succeeded in turning their historical connection into a
shared project around which a true f riendship can f orm. I won’t speculate why this is so. What is clear is
that the potential f or f riendship is gradually shrinking, at least on the German side. Merkel’s f rustration with
the Netanyahu government sits on top of  a waning sympathy f or Israel in the German public, which, it
seems, has long noted the absence of  a shared project. Surveys show a low interest in deeper t ies with
Israel linked to the perception that the Israeli government lacks commitment to solve the conf lict with the
Palestinians and pursues oppressive and expansionist policies, undermining the credibility of  Israel’s victim
identity. Germany’s polit ical elite, and Merkel especially, have long tried to compensate f or this,
yet Staatsräson cannot ignore public opinion f orever. It certainly cannot build a f riendship over it. So if  it  is
to be more than rhetoric, an honest debate, provoked by Grass and others over the nature of  the
relationship is urgently needed – not only in Germany but also in Israel.
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